

PRÉCIS

The notion of freedom is one of the most commonly used concepts set forth in the contemporary era, even if it is understood in many different ways: spontaneity, deliverance from something, deliverance to someone, achievement of clearly defined needs, will, possibility of choice, one's self-determination etc.

The ambiguous diversity of its meaning joins the complexity of forms to which it is applied, freedom can be personal, social, associative, private, public, political, religious, freedom of thought, action, etc. It can be understood negatively as the absence of impediments or constraints or positively, as self-determination and / or autonomy. It is said that freedom is not only a possibility for the human being, but also a way of being; it is not only a natural right, but even an existential goal of the humans¹.

However, in order for human actions and decisions to be always directed towards good or, at least, to a minor evil, freedom requires responsibility and an educated will. One must be aware of the responsibility that derives from free will (as animals always act instinctively), and seek to educate their will towards good.

Although the argument of freedom and will have not benefited from ample treaties during the last century, nor were they an issue in the mass media, however, we believe that its timeliness indwells in not being addressed omnipotent as well as in its often silent but fruitful reflection of the few philosophers who were really interested in this topic. The reflections offered were developed according to the personal conception of those who showed interest in the theme, to the period in which they lived, the power of thought which they were part of and we could list many other factors that influenced the result of their ideas.

In the research that we wish to undertake, we seek to grasp the fundamentals of the question regarding freedom and will which inspired the great medieval Franciscan philosopher J. Duns Scotus. Scotus, through the arguments he provided regarding the question above, helps us to tackle the problem.

Freedom and will, according to his „subtle” thinking directs us to assume good and discovering the truth.

Duns Scotus's thinking is part of the Franciscan system of thinking, and when we talk about this we take unity into consideration. But it must be clear that this unity does not mainly consist in the uniqueness of the doctrine, but rather in the spirit in which doctrines and synthesis have been developed. This spirit appeared along the centuries as a critical, scientific, progressive and practical one².

Reasons for choosing the topic

I chose to treat this issue for several reasons. One of the reasons concerns my studies in the Pontifical Faculty of St. Bonaventure in Rome, an international Franciscan College where in the early years as a student, I took the first steps on the path of knowledge of philosophy. These

1 J. A. Merino, *Visione francescana della vita quotidiana*, Edizione Cittadella, Assisi, 1993, pp. 112-113.

2 I. Tonna, *Lineamenti di filosofia francescana. Sintesi dottrinale del pensiero francescano nei sec. XIII-XIV*, in *Antonianum*, 67/4, Editore Pontificiae Universitatis „Antonianum”, Roma, 1992, p. 547.

studies were my introduction to philosophical thinking and in a special way, in the Franciscan philosophical thinking, which remains a benchmark for all who attended this school from the medieval period up to the present day.

Another reason, a more relevant one, comes as a result of lecturing the students from Duns Scotus I. Faculty of Philosophy at the Franciscan Theological Institute in Rome. In these courses I have often addressed the issue of freedom and will, and presented therefore the vision of the Franciscan philosophical thinking on this subject, in particular Duns Scotus's view.

A final reason is my personal desire to know and to investigate more carefully this theme of freedom and will, the statements made about it, and the answers that we offered by the Franciscan philosophical thinking in general. My willingness to learn is closely linked to the desire to personally deepen and discern motivations, limitations and any possible openings for new horizons, especially interdisciplinary.

Purpose

The purpose of this research is to expose the reflection which John Duns Scotus, the Franciscan philosopher, made on the issue of freedom and will. This research can show us clearly what was the vision of the Franciscan philosopher, who was also known as „the philosopher of freedom and will”. The novelty consists in the fact that the Franciscan philosophy, as philosophical school of thought is not well-known in the Romanian philosophical space, therefore Scotus's thinking is also an element of novelty.

Many philosophers and theologians have been trying to explain an essential element in the practical life of man - free will. What is free will and what is the source that determines a man's free action? We know that the free act committed by man is an act of will and reason. As far as this definition is concerned, most philosophers and theologians agree with it, recognizing the collaboration between will and intellect. But the problem arises when we try to assert primacy. Where does primacy belong to the intellect or the will? Duns Scotus, along with the Franciscan School asserted the primacy to free will in committing the free act.

Current status of the theme

As far as Libertas et voluntas in the view of the Franciscan philosopher theologian J. Duns Scotus Franciscan is concerned, there are no researches in Romania on this topic.

What we find in Romania regarding this theme is the translation of *Despre Primul Principiu* and some conferences (some of which had been published) regarding the thinking of this writer: *Duns Scotus și distincția dintre „metaphysica in se” și „metaphysica quod nos”*; *„Duns Scotus și obiectul metafizicii”*; *„Întrupare și univocitate la Duns Scotus și Nicolas Malebranche”*; *„Omul - ființă relațională în gândirea lui Duns Scotus”*; *„Duns Scotus și analogia entis”*; *„Viața, opera și gândirea filosofică a lui J. Duns Scotus”*, *„Ultima solitudo în gândirea lui I. Duns Scotus”*.

However, abroad, there has been a tendency for decades to implement the scotist thinking. There are numerous writings about the life, work and thought of this author. Tobias Hoffmann wrote a Bibliography from 1950 until today, which includes about three thousand titles: books, articles, chapters in books, translations of the works of Scotus or arguments of Scotus's thinking³. Thus there is a growing interest his thinking and, at the same time, the interest of philosophers, theologians, and others, towards his work.

3 T. Hoffmann, *Duns Scotus Bibliography from 1950 to the present*, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich, 2010.

As for the theme of freedom and will, there are numerous books and articles about freedom or free will. Of course this is due to the scotist interpretation of freedom and will and especially his proposal to entrust the primacy of free will in taking free action. Hence the phrase found in several authors „Scotist voluntarism”.

In general, many books, articles and studies published treat one of the two aspects either liberty, or will. There is only one article written by Castro José Acácio, *Vontade e Liberdade em Joãa Duns Escoto*, in *Humanistica e Teologia* 19 (1998): 67-80. Even if it only treats one of the two issues, the authors agree that freedom and will are in a close connection.

The limit of this paper consists in being unable to access some bibliographic reference sources, especially those coming from German sources, or sources that come from other languages that I do not know. I must mention that there are books and articles written about this topic in Italian, English, French, Spanish, German, Chinese, etc.

As for the conditions of the research, I took a long time in searching and structuring the material. I went four times to Rome to the „St. Bonaventure” College Library in order to research the theme more closely. Without the research there, I would have hardly managed to make even a sketch on the argument. Moreover, the fact that I was able to access two opera Omnia which contain Scotus's treaties, one written by Luke Wadding, published in Lyon in 1639, in 12 volumes; and republished by Louis Vives in Paris between the years 1981-1895, in 26 volumes; and the other one published by the Scotist International Commission set up for Scotus's Critical Writing. This critical edition aims to present only the authentic work of Scotus, eliminating some later additions. There is a small difficulty due to the fact that it is not completed. In my research I tried to use mainly the last two, making few references to the first; the side notes indicate this.

Working Methodology

I seek to apply the scholastic method. I will start from an external point and from one argument to another, I will get to the main point of Scotist thinking: Primacy of will. This step can take place the other way around as well, but I will apply the form I have mentioned. I will apply this methodology for each chapter, namely, I will present the claims of the Scotist personalities who have identified some themes that relate to the main theme of freedom and will, then I will contend original texts (translated from Latin), to confirm the genuine thinking of Scotus.

This method can be also identified with the *aposteriori* philosophical method. We will start from the conclusions made by those who have thoroughly analyzed, and sometimes criticized the Scotist thinking in order to get to Scotus's authentic statements. Basically we will contend quotes regarding the main aspects of Scotus's thinking that the authors have highlighted.

This study consists of exposing a clear vision of freedom and will of the medieval philosopher-theologian J. Duns Scotus.

In the first chapter we have examined the concept of freedom from Aristotle, Augustine, Anselm and Franciscan philosophers. If in ancient times, man was free by birth or as a result of his actions (social, cultural, political), according to the Christian view, all people are seen as being free, both internally (thanks to the grace) and externally (thanks to its essence - the man as the image of God).

Therefore, freedom, according to Saint Augustine, is the power to do what you choose by free will (this being the action of two human faculties, considered to be the most noble - the intellect and the will), it is the good use of free will⁴. Similarly, Saint Anselm, talking about

4 A. I. Adămuț, *Filosofie și teologie la Sfântul Augustin*, Editura Academiei Române, București, 2009, p. 181.

freedom and free will states that freedom is a faculty, that freedom of choice is the faculty of preserving rectitude of will and rectitude itself. Thus, it is clear now that free will is nothing more than the capable choice to keep rectitude of will for rectitude itself⁵.

The Franciscan School, after analyzing freedom, in the answer that some of the Franciscan philosophers have given, believed that in the free action of the human being, will is of a particular importance. For the question: in the exercise of freedom, who bears primacy, intellect or will? Their answer will be will. Through this statement, the Franciscan philosophers do not want to exclude the importance of the intellect in achieving a free action, but they want to say that, eventually, will belongs to the decisional primacy. This line can be seen from the beginning of the Franciscan school in Paris, with Alexander of Hales, and the one from Oxford, with Robert Grosseteste and it will be continued by Bonaventura, Scotus and Ockham.

Bonaventura introduces a change in the Augustinian vision. According to his thinking freedom acts fully, when it has the faculty to direct itself to whatever is deemed to be harmful⁶. It is, therefore, freedom of choice, as through will, we are able to choose the good which one considers to be the most convenient, here and now. According to Augustine freedom represents good use of free will, therefore Bonaventure opens new possibilities of human freedom.

Ockham will take over from Scotus, attending the Franciscan School, not only the primacy of the will but even the concept of self-determination. Therefore, the Ockhamist freedom is not limited to freedom of choice, that is the power to choose between two opposites and different alternatives, but it prevails this option: it is the radical capacity of the will to self-determination.

The essence of freedom does not lie in the act of intellect, but in the privilege of self determination, that is striving for something that is concrete⁷.

In the second chapter we looked at Duns Scotus's concept of freedom. For Scotus, freedom is the most precious and the most noble quality of the soul and therefore of the human being.

As far as the foundation of freedom is concerned, Duns Scotus does not deny that two successive actions are necessary „to want” and „not to want” the same object, but he argues that the self who wants, when taking an action, has the consciousness that it is free to make even the opposite of this action. The key feature of our volitional actions is the power to choose between two opposites and cancel a choice after being made. Scotus in his work show three types of freedom⁸:

- 1) The human person is free to choose contrary actions
- 2) He/she is free to choose the objects that are opposed to each other.
- 3) He/she is free to choose the opposite effects. In this case he/she can choose the goal he/she wants to achieve.

Doctor Subtil talks about freedom and contingency of the world. If we act, we act either out of need or contingently. If we act only necessarily, the action can hardly be free. For this, there is only one possible way, and therefore there are no alternative solutions are there any possible alternatives which could give content and substance to freedom. Freedom is either

5 Anselm de Canterbury, *Despre libertatea alegerii*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2006, pp. 83-85.

6 E. Bettoni, *S. Bonaventura da Bagnoregio. Gli aspetti filosofici del suo pensiero*, Edizione Biblioteca Francescana, Milano, 1973, pp. 205-206.

7 J. A. Merino, *Storia della filosofia francescana*, Edizione Biblioteca Francescana, Milano, 1993, p. 418.

8 M. Mangiagalli, Hannah Arendt, *Il Duns Scoto di Efreim Bettoni e la libertà dell'uomo quale espressione manifestativa della libertà di Dio*, in *Doctorem Subtilem ut plurimum sequimur. Momenti e figura della via Scoti tra filosofia, teologia e diritto*, a cura di Pasquale Giustiniani și Clotilde Punzo, Luciano Editore, Napoli, 2009, p. 187.

impossible, or possible, so that a free person can act contingently. Here Scotus does not want to prove that freedom cannot be removed and that contingency cannot be destroyed. He simply assumes the possibility and actuality of freedom, and seeks to elaborate everything that concerns free act. One may act freely only if he can "want" freely, because it is impossible to act freely, it is impossible to operate freely; then it is impossible to commit free acts⁹.

Scotus indicates the intellect and the will as elements of free will, so both are important in achieving free human action in the exercise of free will. Obviously, for Scotus, all men are endowed with free will, but what sets them apart is the personal use of the available capacity. Some use it correctly choosing the good, while others use it wrong choosing evil. Therefore, what differentiates people is not the capacity that they have, being gifted with free will, but the way they act, using this capability for real, concrete purposes.

Following Anselm, Duns Scotus in this circumstance highlights three modes of freedom of free will. Anselm talks about three releases that man had to accomplish in order to be truly free: freedom from necessity, release from sin and freedom from misery, or the deplorable condition in which the man is. We can see once more the line that follows Scotus, that is the Augustin-Anselm line. It is also the way Bonaventura follows.

Having analyzed Scotus's view on liberty and free will, in the third chapter I will analyze the past. To better understand this, I thought it would be appropriate to start the analysis taking into consideration an important aspect regarding will: the nature of the human will.

The rational nature of man is manifested through the intellect and the will, the most important faculties of the human soul, which does not identify with the soul, they are not really distinct from it. The intellect and the will cannot be identified with the soul because it works in a different way, and the difference in action requires a variety of operant principles¹⁰.

Scotus says that the intellect, the will and the memory, the three potencies of the soul, are formally separate but identical in the soul, the place in which they are in an essential unity. He takes this view from Augustine's thinking¹¹.

When talking about will, Scotus defines it in terms of a rational potency as well as the intellect, but according to his thinking, will has something else, it has the capacity of self-determination regarding choice and, therefore, is a rational and free potency.

As rational inclination, will include a double tendency a passive and an active one. The first one consists in the natural inclination to „want” to get to the object, to its own perfection. The second one is the act of will itself, that is free volition¹².

But what is more important is to remember that in this case we are dealing with two meanings of the term "nature".

Furthermore, I took into account the will and its object. In its action, will seeks to reach human achievement, and this achievement is reached when the will is directed towards perfection, which is the happiness and the good. I took into consideration each in order to understand Scotus's thinking both about happiness and good.

As far as will is concerned, it means nothing else but the tendency of will to direct towards its perfection. In this sense we can say that will always strives for happiness. The

9 A. Vos, *The philosophy of John Duns Scotus*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2006, p. 238.

10 B. Bonansea, *L'uomo e Dio nel pensiero di Duns Scoto*, Editoriale Jaca Book, Milano, 1991, p. 61.

11 G. Alliney, *Giovanni Duns Scotus. Introduzione al pensiero filosofico*, Edizioni di Pagina, Bari, 2012, pp. 138-139.

12 L. Iammarrone, *Giovanni Duns Scotus, metafisico e teologo. Le tematiche fondamentali della sua filosofia e teologia*, Edizione Miscellanea Francescana, Roma, 1999, p. 173.

necessity of this consequence is part of its natural character, so to speak. Again, Duns Scotus emphasizes that the happiness the will aims at, refers to individual happiness, not happiness in general. Searching for happiness means seeking real perfection, and real perfection is not something general or universal¹³.

Nonetheless, the will that strives for an object, always wants to dispose of the object (*Vult is velle illud*). But even if will always acts freely, it will eventually refrain from wanting (*non velle*) from wanting any given object; In other words, it always has the power to give up or suspend its own will. For this reason, will does not necessarily want any symbol of goodness, happiness, and this lack of necessity does not depend on someone who only partially understands happiness¹⁴.

Another important theme is natural and free will. According to Scotus, nature and freedom are two ways through which anything can be produced. Thus, any active principle acts necessarily or freely and there is no other way out of these two opposing essences.

Scotus emphasizes the fact that the intellect and the will bear a different specific task: the intellect - to know the goodness of the object in order to show it to the will, as a condition of every act of will; the will, however, bears the task of understanding the goodness of the object in its own way, goodness being presented intentionally in the volitional act. Due to the fact that the object of will is goodness in general, for Scotus there is a transcendental relation of the volitional act with the goodness that is its object. This relationship implies an „intentional” presence as the object of the volitional act. But this can only be possible if the intellect (*natura prius*) knows the object. The intrinsic rationality of the will requires a presence or a transcendental rapport of good itself through which it is endowed with the power to „prefer”, to compare the „values”¹⁵.

Duns Scotus defines the will as „*libera per essentiam*”, or even „*appetitus rationalis*”, taking care to remove all that through necessity, automatically, naturally, predetermined, is linked to the term „appetites” which qualifies even for Duns Scotus the tendency of the sensitive senses¹⁶.

In this chapter, another important point that I analyzed, is the two phrases: *Affectio commodi* and *Affectio Iustitiae* (the inclination towards one's own interest and the inclination towards justice).

The inclination towards self-interest corresponds to the intellectual capacity as it understood in the natural psychology. The inclination to justice is much more difficult to characterize, but regarding this inclination, one thing is certain: it provides will and freedom with intellectual inclination. Scotus says that this is the final specific difference of free inclinations. Therefore, the inclination towards justice is what distinguishes a free inclination from one that is not free¹⁷.

The will through the two inclinations is directed towards obtaining the good, the well-being (*affectio commodi*) and justice (*affectio iustitiae*), which involves a tendency towards

13 J. Spruyt, *Duns Scotus's criticism of Henry of Ghent's notion of free will*, in *John Duns Scotus, Renewal of Philosophy. Acts of the third Symposium organized by the Dutch Society for medieval philosophy medium aevum* (May 23 și 24, 1996), Edited by E. P. Bos, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam – Atlanta, 1998, p. 148.

14 M. B. Ingham, *The harmony of goodness. Mutuality and moral living according to Jhon Duns Scotus*, Franciscan Institute Publications, St. Bonaventure University, New York, 2012, p. 71.

15 L. Iammarrone, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

16 É. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scoto. Introduction à ses positions fondamentales*, Edition Vrin, Paris, 1952, pp. 579-580.

17 Th. Williams, *The Cambridge Companions to Duns Scotus*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003. p. 345.

perfection, or more than a tendency; it is an effort to move through the scale of degrees in order to achieve maximum perfection.

Freedom as rationality is the assumption of ethical social life. Scotus knows it very well how selfish man is and how difficult it is to implement justice in the society. However, through the power of self-determination which man possesses, even if tearing the intimate selfish ego, is able to act from pure duty. To this end, stands the double potential possibility of will: *affectio commodi* and *affectio iustitiae*: the first one directed towards interest, inclinations, passions, selfishness; the second one, towards the common good and the universal law¹⁸.

In the last chapter we treated the main argument of the Scotist doctrine: *Primacy of the will*.

Scotus contrasts the interpretative line, centered on the primacy of reason drawing a line in the primacy of the will, due to which he seeks to distinguish logical reason, which strengthens the unity of logic that will receive the unit; in order to exalt logic which is expressed by plurality. The script conforms the free Franciscan logos and loving, that the world is an expression of infinite possibilities, and man, life, the world, belonging to the word, that logos which occurred over time¹⁹.

Talking about the intellect and will, we first considered the intellect to see the vision of Dr. Subtil it, and afterwards the will and its primacy.

The first point emphasizes the improving of human nature. There intellect that knows a natural desire to know, and when it reaches its goal of knowing human nature, it is perfected.

The second point I analyzed the second faculty of the soul: the will. According to Duns Scotus's thinking to achieve a free act is the important action both for the will and the intellect. The free act is the result of intellect and will.

Scotus, relying on external expertise, claims that it will have a certain dominance, a certain priority over other potencies of the soul. This causal priority of the will, to the other faculties, love comes from assigning importance of free and total original act. Free will is essential because it is the efficient cause of volition. Intellect comes as a partial cause, it presents the volitional will. Will, besides being free is the cause of the act. Therefore, it is the noblest faculty of man²⁰.

But the priority does not mean exclusion of intellect, since will and intellect as are two of the essential facts of the same soul²¹. Intellect is a *potentia naturalis* and will a potential free and, given his insistence on freedom as perfection Scotus's position on the primacy of the intellect to the will or the will to intellect cannot be doubted. Of course, Duns Scotus wants to affirm the will, commanding the intellect is superior to those of his act, but the intellect, (as a partial cause, providing knowledge object) is a cause will subject²².

We have reached the center point of Scotist thinking: the primacy of will.

First we wanted to contextualize the argument. As we know, will represent an important theme in the work of Duns Scotus. In recent research, many scientists have devoted considerable attention to Scotus's insistence on a proper analysis of capabilities and will and the relationship will has with other human faculties, especially with reason.

18 A. G. Manno, *Introduzione al pensiero di Giovanni Duns Scotus*, Levante Editori, Bari, 1993, p. 303.

19 O. Todisco, *Nella libertà creativa la dignità dell'uomo*, in *Cultură și filozofie franciscană*, nr. 1, Roman, 2011, p. 9.

20 J. A. Merino, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

21 *Ibidem*, p. 314.

22 F. Copleston, *Istoria Filosofiei. Filosofia Medievală*, vol. II, Editura All, București, 2009, p. 534.

A first finding is that this doctrine did not originate in Scotus: in fact, in the words of Irish commentator Anthony Hickey, it was the most common opinion before and after Thomas. But he means that Scotus, demonstrating its validity and consistency gave it a big boost. And especially because of its intrinsic value and natural fascination it exercised and so often the acceptance of thinkers, even outside Scotist school, that saw in it an important result of philosophical speculation and of theological insight, as well²³.

Scotus examines the following issue: if intellect or will is the noblest faculty of man, in a theological context, because the issue causes the required analysis of whether the bliss is essentially the action of the intellect or the will of the action. He examines, first, the arguments of those who opposed, represented by St. Thomas and his followers; then answers each separately; and, finally, has his point of view.

After presenting various arguments against the thesis: primacy in the exercise of free will, answering individually Duns Scotus presents his doctrine. In exercise of two faculties - the will and intellect - on the field of freedom, primacy it is for will, because, in the process of choosing and knowledge of an object, the intellect prepares the act, and the will exercise and consume, choosing or refusing the contemplated object. Intellect starts the action, the likeness of the material element, but will consume it imitating the formal element. Therefore the will have supremacy in the exercise of freedom.

Only the will, he says in an impressive formula, is the total cause of the will. It is true that we must know the object to want it, and the good that we see in this object is what makes us to want it; but it is equally true that if we know an object better than another, it is because we want that. Our ideas determines us, but before we determine the elections of our ideas²⁴.

Continuing his speech on will, Scotus highlights another aspect, of rationality of the will: *the will as rational inclination*. More than just the intellect, the person is characterized by the will, understood as rational freedom.

Will chooses one good instead of another one, hence this act of selection, which is examining the most appropriate to its nature. Will being intrinsically rational, is able to make the comparison, not even practical action that is simultaneously an evaluation of goods which are obtained by measuring an action by another. For Scotus the act of will or choice, will only work includes the comparison of different goods even through an evaluation activities that measure each other. Comparative capacity assigned to will assume that it is equipped of intention²⁵.

In Scotus's writings we often met using the term praxis. Speaks of practical theology, practical philosophy, practical logic etc. In the penultimate paragraph of this chapter we have sought to capture the different nuances on praxis, to better understand what it meant to Scotus's thought.

First of all, what is praxis? For Scotus, the fact of being practical meets three conditions: it's basically everything that depends on an act of will; it is basically just the act that is in the power of to the one who knows; the right decision is taken due to compliance with right reason²⁶.

Scotist volunteerism, in harmony with the concept of freedom as operative power, builds on the individual personality and of history, claiming primacy practicality (praxis) in all spheres: political, civil, religious and theological.

23 B. Bonansea, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

24 É. Gilson, *Filosofia în Evul Mediu*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1995, p. 555.

25 W. Hoeres, *La volontà come perfezione pura in Duns Scotus*, Editrice Liviana, Padova, 1976, p. 287.

26 O. Bulnois, *Duns Scotus. Il rigore della carità*, Editoriale Jaca Book, Milano, 1999, p. 120.

Talking about Praxis I mentioned about the moral norm or moral duty. In the last subsection I have analyzed will before moral duty.

Scotus replies that moral goodness is the integrity of the act by *right reason*. Therefore, what is the rectitude of reason, how can it justify the goodness or evil of an action? Scotus thinks in harmony with all medieval thinkers, that the intellect possess principles known by themselves common order both practical and speculative. In practical field, these principles constitute the natural law, it governs and judge the will without diminishing freedom. In fact, the intellect cannot deny consenting to them, while the will can do it. It is true that the will wants necessarily good in general, but it is also true that it, just because it is free, can move towards this or that object, or to refuse it²⁷.

27 A. M. Prastaro, *Il primato della volontà in Duns Scoto, in Homo et Mundus, Acta Quinti Congressus Scotistici Internationalis Salamanticae, 21-26 septembris 1981*, Edidit Camille Bérubé, Romae, 1984, p. 286.